Generalities
There is a long history in the philosophical literature of discussions of causality. It typically regards a cause as necessary and sufficient for an effect: all children of divorced parents have behavioural problems and all children with behavioural problems have divorced parents. In virtually all sociological contexts, however, the concern is with multiple causes, even if one is predominant. Thus explicit or implicit statistical considerations are inescapable.
Even within the statistical view of causality there are a number of different formulations. Here we review three. In the final section of the paper a specific illustration is sketched.
Causality as stable association
Suppose that there is clear evidence that two features of the individuals (people, communities, households, ...) under investigation are associated, a possible cause C and a possible response R. For instance, individuals with high values of C may tend to have high values of R and vice versa. Thus C and R might be test scores on individuals at a given age in arithmetic and language or they may be unemployment rate and level of crime in a community.
What might it mean to conclude that C is a cause of a response R?
Symmetric and directed relations
Association is a symmetric relation between two or possibly more features but causality is asymmetric. That is, if C is associated with R then R is associated with C, but if C is a cause of R then R is not a cause of C. Thus, given any two features C and R, we need to distinguish the possibilities where 1. C and R are to be treated on an equal footing and dealt with symmetrically in any interpretation 2. one of the variables, say C, is to be regarded as explanatory to the other variable, R, regarded as a response. Then, if there is a relation, it is regarded asymmetrically.
The distinction here is not about statistical significance but rather is concerned with substantive interpretation.
Graphical representation
A useful graphical representation shows two variables X 1 and X 2 regarded on an equal footing, if associated, as connected by an undirected edge, whereas two variables such There are two possible bases for the distinction between explanatory and response variables and thus for using a directed edge. One is that features referring to an earlier time-point are explanatory to features referring to a later time-point. Thus aspects of previous education may be possible explanatory variables for subsequent career performance. In such situations the relevant time is not the time when the observation is made but the time to which the features refer, although, of course observations recorded retrospectively are especially subject to recall biases. The second is a subjectmatter working hypothesis based for example on theory or on empirical data from other kinds of investigation. Suppose that cross-sectional data are collected on current salary and on attitudes to various social and political issues. It might then be reasonable to regard provisionally income as explanatory to attitudes, of course only as part of a more complex network of relationships.
3
In summary, the first step towards causality is to require good reasons for regarding C as explanatory to R as a response and that any notion of causal connection between C and R is that C is a cause of R not the other way round.
Common explanatory variables
Next consider the possibility of one or more common explanatory variables. For this, suppose that a background variable B is potentially explanatory to C and hence also to R. There are a number of possibilities of which the most general is shown in Figure   1c with directed edges from B to C, from C to R and also directly from B to R. On the other hand, if the relation were that represented schematically in Figure 1d , the only dependence between C and R is that induced by their both depending on B. Then C and R are said to be conditionally independent given B, sometimes conveniently
There is no direct path from C to R that does not pass via B.
Such relations are typically assessed empirically by some form of regression analysis.
In such a situation one would not regard C as a cause of R even though in an analysis without the background variable B there is a statistical dependence between C and R.
This discussion leads to one definition used in the literature of C being a cause of R, namely that there is a dependence between C and R and that the sign of that dependence is unaltered whatever variables B 1 , B 2 , . . . themselves explanatory to C are considered simultaneously with C as possible sources of dependence. This definition has a long history but is best articulated by I. J. Good and P. Suppes. A corresponding notion for time series is due to N.Wiener and C.W.J. Granger. This definition underlies much empirical statistical analysis in so far as it aims towards causal explanation.
The definition entertains all possible alternative explanatory variables. In any particular study one can at best check that the measured background variables B do not account for the dependence between C and R. The possibility that the dependence could be explained by variables explanatory to C that have not been measured, i.e.
by so-called unobserved confounders, is less likely the larger the apparent effect and can be discounted only by general plausibility arguments about the field in question.
Sensitivity analysis may be helpful as it involves calculating what the properties of an unobserved confounder would have to be to explain away the dependence in question.
When the empirical dependence found is very strong it may be possible to argue that it is implausible that there is an unmeasured variable itself with a strong enough dependence to explain away totally the observed effect. For further details see Rosenbaum (1995) .
Role of randomization
Although physical randomization by the investigator is rarely possible in sociological investigations, it is conceptually important to consider briefly its consequences for interpretation. Then in the scheme sketched in Figure 1e there can be no edge between the B's and C since such dependence would be contrary to randomization, i.e. to each individual under study being equally likely to receive each treatment possibility. In this situation an apparent dependence between C and R cannot be explained by a background variable as in Figure 1d . It is in this sense that causality can be inferred from randomized experiments and not from observational studies as sometimes stated, especially in the statistical literature. While, other things being equal, randomized experiments are greatly to be preferred to observational studies, difficulties of interpretation, sometimes serious, remain. The most important are possible interactive effects, especially with unobserved explanatory variables, and unanticipated future interventions in the system under study that remain unnoticed when the final response is recorded.
Intermediate variables
In the above discussion the variables B have been supposed explanatory to C and hence to R. For judging a possible causal effect of C it would be wrong to consider in the same way variables intermediate between C and R, i.e. variables I that are responses to C and explanatory to R. Although they are valuable in clarifying the nature of any indirect path between C and R, the use of I as an explanatory variable in a regression For instance suppose that C represents an aspect of primary school education and I some feature of secondary education, which in turn affects some aspect of employment;
see Figure 2a . Does the aspect of primary education cause a change in R? If R is conditionally independent of C given I it would be reasonable to say that primary education does cause a change in R and that this change appears to be explained via what happens in secondary education.
Explanatory variables on an equal footing
An even more delicate situation arises with variables C * on an equal footing with the variable C whose causal status is under consideration; see Figure 2b .
If the role of C is essentially the same whether or not C * is conditioned, i.e. whether or not C * is included in the regression equation, there is no problem at least at a qualitative level. On the other hand it is relatively common to find clear dependence on (C, C * ) as a pair but that either variable on its own is sufficient to explain the dependence. There are then broadly three routes to interpretation:
1. to regard (C, C * ) collectively as the possibly causal variables 6 2. to present at least two possibilities for interpretation, one based on C and one on C * 3. to obtain further information clarifying the relation between C and C * , establishing for instance that C * is explanatory to C and that the appropriate interpretation is to fix C * when analysing variations of R.
For example, suppose that C and C * are respectively measures of educational performance in arithmetic and language of a child both measured at the same age and that the response is some adult feature. Then the third possibility is inapplicable; the first possibility is to regard the variables as a two-dimensional measure of educational performance and to abandon, at least temporarily, any notion of separating the role of arithmetic and language. In the second route we would recognize two alternative simple explanations consistent with the data, one based on arithmetic and one on language.
This is typically studied via the careful examination of empirical regression equations, for example for binary R via logistic regression.
Causality as the effect of intervention

Counterfactuals
The concept of causality discussed above is important and is connected with the approach adopted in many empirical statistical studies. It does, however, not directly capture a stronger interpretation of the word causal. This is connected with the idea of hypothetical intervention or modification. Suppose for simplicity of exposition that C takes just two possible forms, to be called presence and absence. Thus presence might be the implementation of some programme of intervention, absence a suitable control state. For monotone relations one may say that presence of C causes an increase in the response R if an individual with C present tends to have a higher R than that same individual would have had if C had been absent, other things being equal.
Slightly more explicitly let B denote all variables possibly explanatory to C and suppose that there are no variables C * to be considered on an equal footing to C. For a given individual only one of R pres and R abs can be observed, corresponding to the value of C actually holding for that individual. The other value of R is a so-called counterfactual whose introduction is, however, useful to capture the notion hinted at above of a deeper meaning of causality.
Formalizing differences in counterfactuals
The simplest and least demanding relation between the two values of R is that over some population of individuals under study the average of R pres exceeds that of R abs . This is a notion of an average effect and is testable empirically in favourable circumstances. A much stronger requirement is that the required inequality holds for every individual in the population of concern. Stronger still is the requirement that the difference between the two values of R is the same for all individuals, i.e. that for all individuals
This is called in the language of the theory of the design of experiments the assumption of unit-treatment additivity. Now these last two assumptions are clearly not directly testable and can be objected to on that account. The assumptions are indirectly testable, to a limited extent at least.
If the individuals are divided into groups, for example on the basis of one or more of the background variables B, the assumptions imply for each individual observed that the difference between the two levels of R has the same sign in the first case and the 8 second case. However, overlooking that a possibly causal variable C has a very different effect on different individuals can have severe consequences.
Intrinsic variables or attributes
There is an important restriction implicit in this discussion. It has to be meaningful in the context in question to suppose that a potential cause C for an individual might have been different from how it in fact is. This is relevant only to variables that appear solely as explanatory variables. For example they may be variables measured at base-line, although not quite all, contexts meaningless. To distinguish changing C to a given level with certain other features held fixed from the probabilistic notion of conditioning Pearl (1995) has introduced the terminology of setting C to its required level; see also Pearl (2000) and Lauritzen (2000) for further discussion.
Variables to be held fixed
Causality as explanation of a process
There is a third notion of causality that is in some ways more in line with normal scientific usage. In this context causality implies that there is some understanding, albeit provisional, of the process that leads from C to R. This understanding typically comes from theory, or often from knowledge at a hierarchical level lower than the data under immediate analysis. Sometimes, it may be possible to represent such a process by a graph without directed cycles and to visualize the causal effect by the tracing of paths from C to R via variables I intermediate between C and R. Thus the effect of interventions at a community level might be related to ideas of individual psychology.
This last notion of causality as concerned with generating processes is to be contrasted with the second view of causality as concerned with the effects of intervention and with the first view of causality as stable statistical dependence. These views are complementary not conflicting. Goldthorpe (1998) has argued for this third view of causality as the appropriate one for sociology with explanation via Rational Choice
Theory as an important route for interpretation.
To be satisfactory there needs to be evidence, typically arising from studies of different kinds, that such generating processes are not merely hypothesized. Causality is not to be established by merely calling a statistical model causal.
Explanations of phenomena in terms of underlying processes are inevitably provisional. Nevertheless they are the cornerstone of the Natural Sciences. We suggest that statistical analysis should aim towards establishing processes that are potentially causal.
Special issues
Interaction involving a potentially causal variable
We now turn to the issue of interactions with a potentially causal variable. The graphical representations used above to show the structure of various kinds of dependency and independency holding between a set of variables have the limitation, in the form used here, that they do not represent interaction, in particular that an effect of C may be systematically different for different groups of individuals. For example if B is an intrinsic feature such as gender, we consider whether the effect of C is different for men and for women. In particular, if the effects of C are in opposite directions for different levels of B we say there is a qualitative interaction, a possibility of special importance for interpretation.
Note especially that even when C represents a randomized treatment which is automatically decoupled from preceding possibly unobserved variables B the possibility of serious interactions with B cannot in general be ignored.
Viewed slightly differently, absence of interaction is important not only in simplifying interpretation but also in enhancing generalizability and specificity. That is, an effect that has been shown to have no serious interaction with a range of potential variables is more likely to be reproduced in some new situation and more likely to have a stable subject-matter interpretation.
Unwanted unobserved intermediate variable
Consider further the role of variables I referring to time points after the implementation of C. A subject-matter distinction can be drawn between on the one hand intermediate variables that are responses to C and that are explanatory to R and are part of some natural process and on the other hand interventions into the system that may depend on C and which may be explanatory to R but which in some sense are unwanted or inappropriate for interpretation. Thus in studying the effect of modifications in inner city housing policies on satisfaction it may be necessary to take account of interventions other than those which are the immediate object of study. Another example is in evaluations of study programs whenever students in only one of the programs receive unplanned intensive encouragement during the evaluation period. 
Bradford Hill's conditions
The above discussion implicitly emphasizes that, while causal understanding is the aim of perhaps nearly all research work, a cautious approach is essential, especially but not only in observational studies. The most widely quoted conditions tending to make a causal interpretation more likely are those of Hill (1965) put forward in connection with the interpretation of epidemiological studies. Hill emphasized their tentative character.
For a critical discussion of these conditions, see Rothman and Greenland (1998) .
Because they are usually mentioned in an epidemiological context we reproduce them in outline in a slightly revised version (Cox and Wermuth, 1996, section 8.7 ).
According to these conditions a dependency is more likely to be causal
• if an a priori subject-matter explanation of it is available
• if a convincing subject-matter explanation is found retrospectively although such is typically less convincing than an a priori explanation
• if the effect is a large one, it then being less likely that there is an alternative explanation via an unmeasured confounder
• if the dependency has a natural monotonic relation with levels of the explanatory variable in question
• if the effect is found repeatedly in independent studies especially if these are of somewhat different form
• if there is no major interaction with intrinsic features
• if the dependence is the consequence of a massive intervention in the system. 
A sociological case study
Causal formulations are common in social science contexts whenever empirical research is planned to study explanations for the development of opinions, attitudes and judgements or behaviour. In these cases those statistical models and analyses are especially helpful which permit to include prior expectations on a developmental process since they provide interpretations that are compatible with causal explanations.
We give an example of deriving a graphical Markov model that concerns the de- Since we do not consider any two of the four judgements to relate like response and explanatory variable they are treated as being on equal footing, i.e. they are listed in the same box, so that some joint response model will be used for their analysis. Jointly Table   1 ) are essentially identical. For the judgement of the own social position (in Table 2) the general level and the effects of the predictors risk for exclusion from work-force and own education are unchanged over the years, while the importance of parents' education has decreased and the effect of marital status is strong only in 1991. Though the overall risk of exclusion from work-force has decreased in Germany from 1984 to 1991 the direction of dependencies has remained unchanged for own education, marital status and gender. The risk is higher for less formal schooling, for females, and for the unmarried. Only the relative importance of gender has diminished, the one of marital status has increased over the years. Thus, the type of dependencies are replicated except when political changes can explain changes in dependencies.
The interpretation in terms of tracing paths is close to the original suggestions of While, of course, conclusions from a single observational study are inevitable provisional, the approach brings us a step closer to the notions of causality discussed in the first part of the paper. The analysis gives more insight than, for example only direct regression analysis of the final response on all available potentially explanatory variables.
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